Abstract

Since the concepts employed in analyzing a kind of phenomenon influence the problems and solutions associated with that phenomenon, 3 concepts used to discuss experimental clairvoyance were studied. An examination of the 1st 2, knowledge and perception, led to the objection that experimental clairvoyance is impossible because it violates a condition, namely, sensory apprehension, required for knowledge or perception of an object. These concepts are analyzed and shown to be inappropriate to that phenomenon. Hence, the objection, which is based on these concepts, is spurious. Furthermore, these concepts generate problems--the most notable being that of accounting for a connection between the S and target--which are avoidable if the concepts are not used. A 3rd and alternative concept which appears in discussions of the phenomenon is introduced: guessing, which is shown to be appropriate to the phenomenon without in any way denying it. It is argued that this concept obviates certain problems, especially the S/target-connection issue associated with the preceding 2 concepts. Moreover, this concept clarifies other issues, in particular what kinds of options might be available for explaining the phenomenon. Finally, this concept fits experimental findings.