Abstract

Since this writer first proposed the Quantum Observer Theory (QOT) of paraphysical phenomena, PA philosophers have voiced objections over dualism and the "causal loop" problem. Hoyt Edge in his "Dualism and the Self: A Cross-Cultural Perspective" takes John Beloff to task for his espousal of Dualism. Beloff defends dualism, holds that pararnormal phenomena prove the reality of dualism, and attacks the QOT as a physicalistic theory intending to explain away parapsychological evidence for dualism. He argues that causal loops show QOT theory to be wrong. In this, Beloff cites Stephen Braude's work on the causal loop question as his proof. Braude argues against "observer theory" and exposes flaws in some of these OT presentations that have been offered subsequent to the introduction of the QOT.

This paper reviews the narrow scientific position regarding dualism. It covers the common position on dualism within philosophy, that is, why dualism is philosophically impossible and absurd. However, we note that today all of modern science stands on three pillars of physics: Quantum Mechanics, Relativity Theory, and the Standard Model; with these, science describes everything we see and everything that conventional scientific laboratories can test. All this knowledge makes it now possible to give proof that duality (as a characteristic) is necessary and a scientific fact, namely: 1. Consciousness is something real. 2. Physics defines what constitutes physicality. 3. Measurement is the cornerstone of physics; if something is not physically measurable, it is not a part of physical reality. 4. It is not possible to measure consciousness. 5. Thus, the fact that consciousness exists, but is not physically measurable, means the consciousness is real but nonphysical. Thus, Edge's and Beloff's concerns are addressed and Beloff's apprehension shown to be misplaced.

Next Braude's arguments on causal loops is considered. We support Braude's position against causal loops. However, Braude's arguments are incompatible with the established facts of teleologicality in the least action principles of classical, quantum, and relativity theories. Braude mixes causality arguments with formal logic and deviates from the formalism given for QOT.

Finally, we present the proper interpretation of the QOT. Two variants of this are mentioned, as both are instructive. One holds that the events are "forward constrained teleological" events in which the psi observer constrains the future development of the state vector. The other understanding holds that time elements are quantized, of variable length, and have differing information content as perceived. That is to say, a psi event is teleological over a span of time that includes the observers of the system. Moreover, the part of the observers' consciousness that is involved is generally extremely small. An observer's present moment, therefore, appears as if limited to the few milliseconds of ordinary observation.